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Since the inception of the GATT system in 1947, the multilateral trading system has
seen quotas imposed on products ranging from cheese and butter to high deﬁnition
televisions, steel, and motor vehicles. Such quantitative restrictions on international
trade ﬂows, and more broadly speaking the entire class of non-tari  barriers (NTBs),
have proven an important feature of the policy landscape. For this reason, estimates
of the trade cost-equivalents of NTBs are critical inputs to the assessment of the
welfare impact of trade policy, as well as to actual trade negotiations. They also
inﬂuence the trade patterns at the core of the raft of recent econometric work based
on the gravity model. (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003, 2004).
In recent history, the launching of the World Trade Organization brought with it
the dismantling of the single biggest system of quota restrictions to emerge as part of
the GATT-based trading system – an elaborate system of bilateral quotas on textiles
and clothing trade. (See Table 1 for a brief overview of this history). The process
of dismantling these quotas under the ATC (Agreement on Textiles and Clothing)
was staged over a 10 year period ending in 2005. The quotas generated hundreds
of billions of dollars in quota rents over the ten-year life of the ATC (and hundreds
of billions of dollars more in the prior decades under the Multiﬁbre Arrangement,
MFA).
In this paper, we develop a panel-based estimator for the trade cost equivalent of
quotas, using importer-exporter-pair departures from gravity-based trade ﬂows over
time to estimate the time-path of the export tax equivalent of quotas. We apply
1this method to the ATC quota phasout.1 The ATC quota regime o ers an appealing
testing ground for estimating the time path of NTBs. This is because the quotas were
expanded and eliminated in structured stages under the ATC over a deﬁned period
of time, and because they involved a large number of importers and exporters. While
by construction the quotas were increased over time, our results conﬁrm the casual
empirical observation that the technical liberalization of a quota does not guarantee
de-facto relaxation of implicit trade barriers when the external environment is also
changing. In the case of China, quotas clearly grew at a rate unable to keep up with
the rapid expansion of potential trade due to both underlying supply and demand
growth. Thus, our estimates provide important policy lessons as well.
Because we work with a panel, there are years where quotas governing bilateral
trade pairs switch from being binding to not binding, and vice-versa. Estimating
quota rents econometrically is therefore complicated by the need to distinguish sit-
uations where quotas bind from those where they do not. In addition, as long as
some quotas are binding, regressing output on price variables (like tari s) will result
in a downward biased price coe cient because there is no price response for some
country pairs. Furthermore, where the quota is binding one must explicitly ensure
that the quota always reduces imports and never increases imports. This points to
a need for estimation methods that allow for inequality constraints and avoid poten-
1The literature on estimating the impact of NTBs has largely followed one of three approaches.
The one we build on here is econometric, involving estimating the price e ects using residual-based
methods (Leamer 1990, Harrigan 1993, Rose 2002, Mayer 2003, Nicita and Olarreaga 2007). A
second approach involves examination of auction prices (Mlachila and Yang 2004; Andriamananjara
et al 2004). A third approach involves direct price comparisons (Cahill and Legg 1990; Tyers and
Anderson 1992). Also see Rose (2004) for a detailed discussion of the related question of measuring
general trade openness.
2tial bias in price elasticities. We address these issues, while also using quadrature for
assessing the robustness of our estimates. Hence, our approach collectively corrects
several potential shortcomings in econometrically-based estimates of the price impact
of quota restrictions in international trade – including reliance on point estimates,
the need for inequality constraints, and correction for an estimation bias linked to
price elasticities.2
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide brief institutional
background on the ATC. In Section 3 we develop our estimating framework. We
apply the framework to textiles and clothing trade in Section 4. We provide a
summary and closing comments in Section 5.
2 Background
The Ministerial Declaration at Punta Del Este in 1986 that launched the Uruguay
Round stated that the “Negotiations in the area of textiles and clothing shall aim
to formulate modalities that would permit the eventual integration of this sector
into GATT on the basis of strengthened GATT rules and disciplines.” In plain
English, this was a promise to developing countries that MFA quotas were ﬁnally
going to be eliminated. Indeed, this promise was critical to convincing developing
2In a related paper, Treﬂer (1993) also confronts the issue of inequality constraints when ex-
amining the joint dependence of NTB levels (measured as coverage ratios) and import penetration
rates. As he works with the joint determination of trade and protection ratios, which by deﬁnition
are bound at zero, Treﬂer uses a simultaneous Tobit estimator. Rose (2002) uses average residuals
across a panel, essentially treating country ﬁxed-e ect terms in the panel as measures of average
openness. One could apply the same approach to country-pair terms. In contrast, we essentially
add a time dimension to the evolution of country-pair e ects through an inequality constrained
n-degree polynomial.
3countries to sign on at the creation of the then new World Trade Organization
(WTO). The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations launched at Punta Del Este
led to the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) in 1995, the institutional
shape given to the promise to end quotas in an orderly process.
The ATC was ﬂagged as a major showpiece in the Uruguay Round Agreements,
and an important source of trade-based income gains linked to the introduction of
the World Trade Organization (WTO).3 By design, the agreement mapped a gradual
phase-out of the quota restrictions carried over from the MFA regime on a ten-year
timetable leading to full elimination. 4 Given its clear rules and the following removal
of quota restrictions, the ATC serves as a natural experiment to test for the economic
impact of quantitative constraints over time.
3See Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1995); Francois, McDonald, and Nordstrom (1995); Hertel
et al (1995).
4The integration of the products covered by the agreement was to be achieved in three stages
under a ten-year transition period. The ﬁrst stage called for the integration of products comprising
not less than 16 percent of the total volume of each member’s 1990 imports of the products listed
in the annex to the Agreement. The second stage, beginning in year 4, required the integration
of a further 17 percent. The third stage, beginning in year 8, required that another 18 percent
of imports be brought under normal GATT rules. Furthermore, each importing country was free
to choose the products it would integrate at each stage, the only constraint being that they had
to encompass products from each of the four groupings: tops and yarn, fabrics, made-up textile
products, and clothing. Products that remained restricted during the transition period were to
beneﬁt from a progressively increasing quota. The previously applied MFA quota annual growth
rates were to be scaled up by a factor of 16 percent in the ﬁrst stage - for instance, from 3 percent
to (3 x 1.16 =) 3.48 percent - an additional 25 percent in the second stage, and yet another 27
percent in the third stage. This turned a 3 percent initial annual growth rate to 5.52 percent in
the third stage. In the next sections we quantify the impact of quotas under the ATC, and the
evolution of their economic e ects over the full ATC implementation period.
43 Estimating Framework
3.1 Export Tax Equivalents
In this section, we provide a basic outline of our techniques for non-linear panel es-
timation of NTBs. More detail is provided in the technical annex. We ﬁrst correct
for bias in price elasticity estimates (a critical component in calculating the price
impact of quotas) by employing a 2-step estimation procedure. We do this because
we expect (an expectation supported quite strongly by the data and discussed below
with respect to Tables 2 and 3) that trade elasticity estimates are biased downward
when the sample includes quota-constrained trade. Second, we base our estimates on
joint estimation across a broad sample of importers and exporters. This di ers from
the econometric literature in this area, which tends to focus on single importers. (See
for example Evans and Harrigan 2005.) Our approach allows us to integrate the es-
timation process for price impacts with the panel-based estimation of the underlying
gravity model. Third, we also impose non-linear constraints on the quotas, acknowl-
edging the fact that a quota can only be binding or zero, but never act as a subsidy
for exports. This introduces the mixed-complementarity aspect of the estimation
problem. Finally, as we are working with estimates based on a large non-linear
econometric system, we introduce Gaussian quadrature to estimate conﬁdence inter-
vals of our coe cient estimates. This means we implement a technique for assessing
robustness of our residual-based quota estimates given parameter uncertainty.
The impact of quantitative restrictions on trade is reﬂected in per-unit economic
rent generated by a binding quota. This is because a binding quota e ectively limits
5the supply of the good in the importing market, resulting in a price markup and
giving economic rents to those suppliers who have access to the market (i.e. who
are able to export inside the quota). Since the quotas on textiles and clothing were
administered as “voluntary” export restraints by the suppliers, often with the quotas
distributed by auction, these rents can alternatively be seen as an implicit tax on
exports. For these reasons, the e ect of the quotas in the literature is generally
expressed as an export tax equivalent or ETE.
3.2 Data
We work with trade and tari  data from the UN COMTRADE database and the
WTO’s database of applied tari s, supplemented where necessary with information
from the UNCTAD TRAINS database. These data are available through the UNC-
TAD/ World Bank WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution) data system, and yield
trade and applied tari  data spanning from 1996 to the most recently released data.
For EU Members, we have had to combine common external tari  data from the
WTO with individual Member import data from COMTRADE. Our trade and tar-
i  data have been combined, in turn, with data on geographic distance taken from
CEPII’s recent compilation of various distance measures. (See Clair et al 2004.) We
are estimating the quota impact separately for the textiles sector and the clothing
sector. In total, this yields a database with 47,500 observations on bilateral textile
trade ﬂows and 44,452 observations on bilateral clothing trade ﬂows, including 27,442
observations on OECD textile imports and 26,071 observations on OECD clothing
imports. These data cover bilateral trade during the ATC – i.e. from 1996 to 2004.
6Not all countries have reported recent data to UNCTAD on a timely basis (a problem
especially for developing countries) so that there are missing data on country pairs
for later years. Annually, the data range between roughly 2,200 and 7,000 bilateral
ﬂows per year and sector.
For the period covered by our sample, import quotas were maintained by the
United States, Canada, and the (then 15) Members of the European Union. The
US import quotas (not all involving WTO Members) covered 46 exporters. The
European Union import quotas (again not all involving WTO Members) covered 20
exporters. 5 Canadian quotas covered 43 exporters at the launch of the ATC. In our
sample, 18,412 of our textile data points involve imports by quota users, while 17,787
of our clothing data points involve imports by quota users. For the United States,
we have 10 years of trade ﬂows with 46 quota countries, or 460 bilateral time-country
pairs impacted by quotas. For Canada we have 9 years of trade ﬂows for 43 quota
countries, or 387 bilateral time-country pairs impacted by quotas. For the European
Union, because they ran a common quota system, we have 9 years of trade ﬂows for
15 EU importers and 20 quota exporters, or 2,700 time-country pairs impacted by
quotas and 180 observations on trade ﬂows per quota.
5We note that the EU’s quota monitoring system, SIGL, lists more countries. However, while
more exporters are listed in the SIGL database, closer inspection of these entries reveals that the
EU was only using quotas actively against the 20 partners identiﬁed in our sample during the ATC.
73.3 The Estimating Equations
Following almost all of the recent literature (Anderson and van Wincoop 2004,Feen-
stra 2002 ) we start by specifying CES import demand functions.6 As we are working
with data that reﬂect actual trade ﬂows and actual prices, and for which therefore
price indexes can be taken as given and controlled for with dummy variables in each
cross-section, this is consistent with either the Armington approach to modeling trade
ﬂows or Ethier/Krugman-type monopolistic competition based on CES demand for
varieties produced by ﬁrms. When we turn to our data, we treat each year in our
panel as representative of an equilibrium set of prices and transaction quantities.
Formally, starting from CES preferences, if we take any importing country j, then
the ﬁrst order conditions from constrained optimization of the CES composite given










where mij represents total imports by country j from country i, Ej is total ex-
penditure on the product category, pij is the internal price index for goods im-





1/ , Pj is the CES composite price index linked to this aggregator,
6We can obtain a more general version of equation (1) in percent di erences by manipulation
of a standard import demand function where imports are (imperfect) substitutes for each other.
The CES representation is then a special case which we use as it maps directly to the standard
representation of import demand in national and ﬁrm-level product di erentiation models, in the
modern gravity model literature, and in numerical trade models.
8and   is the absolute value of the Allen-elasticity of substitution. We will later im-
pose identical weights   across OECD importers, so that we can drop the second
subscript.
We can in turn map world prices for goods, indexed across exporters i, to internal
prices, indexed by importer j, as follows:
pij = Pi
  (1 +  ij)(1 +  ij) ij (2)
In equation (2), Pi
  is the world or fob price index for exports from country i,  ij
is the bilateral tari  applied to imports from country i sold in country j,  ij is the
export tax equivalent of quantitative restraints, measuring the price impact of non-
tari  barriers, and  ij measures transport costs following from goods moving between
i and j. Such costs may be a function of geographic distance, for example, as is well
established in the gravity equation literature. (See for example Disidier and Head
2003 and Anderson and van Wincoop 2003.)
To move from equations (1) and (2) to estimating equations, we ﬁrst substitute
equation (2) into equation (1), neglecting the quantitave constraints for a moment,
and then take logs. We also add our time subscripts at this stage. This yields
equation (3).
logmi,j,t = logEj     logP
 
i     log(1 +  ij)
   log ij +   log ij + (    1)logPj (3)
We use exporter dummies to control for fob price indexes, such that with the dum-
9mies in place the values of imports net of trade and distance barriers then map to
quantities. These dummies also control for an important e ect in the recent literature
– systematic variations in unit values linked to individual exporters and importers.
(See Schott 2004). We also assume importers assign similar CES country weights  
in the cross-section, and specify transport costs  ij as a function of both geographic
distance Dij and a dummy for common borders Bij. Finally, we control for both
the domestic internal price index P and the set of import CES weights through
time-varying importer and exporter dummies X and M. Through this speciﬁcation
we eliminate what Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) label the gold-medal error (omission
of the multilateral trade resistance term according to Anderson and Van Wincoop
2003) as well as the bronze-medal error (i.e. problems arising from the incorrect
speciﬁcation of trade and GDP ﬁgures).7 For our panel of observations indexed over
time t we therefore have:
logmijt =    log(1 +  ijt) +  borderBij +  distance logDij
+ timet + Xit + Mjt + eijt (4)
When we introduce quotas, we take advantage of the fact that in observed trade data,
expenditures will reﬂect the price impact of the quotas. This allows us to estimate the
manifestation of these price e ects through the export-tax equivalent of the quota.
Here, we follow much of the recent literature, where the coe cients on NTBs are
assumed to capture the tax or price equivalent of the NTBs in question. (See for
7The use of country ﬁxed e ects in the recent literature on trade elasticities also o ers an elegant
solution to a problem plaguing the earlier literature, linked to the estimation of unit values from
trade value and quantity data. See Shiells (1991) and Reinert and Shiells (1993) for discussion.
10example the thorough discussion in Anderson and van Wincoop 2004).8 However, it
is then important to recognize that a quota is either binding, or not binding. This
means that the export tax equivalents of the quota  ij will be either positive or zero,
but will not be negative. We therefore impose inequality constraints on the ETEs
of the quotas. Finally, as we are working with a panel, and we know that the ATC
involved a staged process of quota expansion, we assume we can model the evolution
of the ETEs over time using a truncated fourth-degree polynomial (meaning that
its applicability in time t depends on whether or not the inequality constraint is
binding.) Putting all this together, we have:
logmijt =    log(1 +  ijt) +  borderBij +  distance logDij
+ timet + Xit + Mjt
   log(1 +  ijt) + eijt (5)
log(1 +  ijt) = max
 
   
   
aij + a1ijt + a2ijt2 + a3i,jt3 + a4ijt4
0
(6)
8There are several issues here related to choice of functional form and conservation of degrees
of freedom. For example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) note that almost the entire literature
relies on log linear cost speciﬁcations for our equation (1), which corresponds to equation (11) in
their paper. However, an alternative involves strictly linear versions, though there is then a trade-o 
between degrees of freedom and generality. Since additive costs can be transformed into log-additive
costs (for example by normalizing prices), we do not see this as a critical issue. More important
is conservation of degrees of freedom. In much of the literature, estimates of NTBs are based on
single year residuals, yielding point estimates. Alternatively, to deal with degrees of freedom issues,
Treﬂer (1993) basically assumes that U.S. NTBs have the same trade-reducing e ect for all goods
in a product category that it imports from the rest of the world, while Harrigan (1993) assumes
that the importing country’s NTB has the same trade displacement e ect for each exporter from
which it buys a good. The middle-road followed here is to specify a polynomial for the evolution
of NTB price e ects, again conserving degrees of freedom.
11The inequality constraint on the matrix of export tax equivalents is reﬂected in
equation (6).9 Combined with the equality of the tari  and quota price elasticity
  in equation (5), this puts us in the realm of non-linear inequality constrained
mathematical programming problems when we focus on the estimation of the quota
price wedges  . 10
4 Estimated ETEs: The Evolution of Quota Rents
Tables 2 and 3 report ordinary least square (OLS) estimates for equation (4). The
ﬁrst column in both tables shows OLS results for the full sample, while the subsequent
columns show OLS results for the sub-samples of non-OECD countries, OECD coun-
tries, and OECD countries excluding quota users. Thus, columns 1 and 3 are based
on a mixed sample of quota constrained and quota free exporters, while columns 2
9While not reported here, we have also estimated three di erent sets of quota price e ects
mapped to ATC stages 1, 2 and 3 as indicated in Table 1. The ﬁt of the regression is better when
allowing for a more ﬂexible, non-linear time trend over the whole period, though the results of both
sets of estimation are basically the same. Since many factors inﬂuencing the cost e ects of the
quotas (like for instance supplier capacity, tari s, regional agreements, etc.) change annually and
not with the di erent stages of the ATC, it seems reasonable to allow for greater ﬂexibility in the
estimation. Higher degree polynomials do not yield any real di erence in the ﬁt of the model to
the trade data, based on a comparison of the resulting ETEs.
10At ﬁrst sight our estimation problem might appear to su er from too few degrees of freedom.
However, we are estimating equations 5 and 6 based on the full set of quota constrained and
quota free pairs of trading partners. Thus, we have to estimate “only” 109 sets of bilateral quota
coe cients. In combination with our coe cients on distance and border variables and the like,
time variables, time varying importer ﬁxed e ects, and time varying exporter ﬁxed e ects and
quota coe cients, we have a total of 1607 ﬁxed parameters to be estimated from a sample of
roughly 47500 observations. Our use of a constrained polynomial with the panel allows us to
conserve degrees of freedom, o ering a marked improvement over the direct residual approach. In
our panel it leaves us with 5 degrees of freedom for the U.S. and Canada per quota exporter and 160
per quota exporter for the European Union (as we have 15 countries with the same quota) instead
of essentially zero degrees of freedom with strict residual methods. It also o ers an alternative
to making more restrictive assumptions across country pairs to conserve degrees of freedom, as
discussed in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004).
12and 4 are based on non-quota suppliers only. As quantity constraints, by deﬁnition,
limit price-sensitivity, we expect this to bias downward any estimate of price sensi-
tivity. As a consequence, we expect a lower estimate of the tari  elasticity in colums
1 and 3 as compared to the unbiased estimates in columns 2 and 4. Indeed, the pat-
tern is one of signiﬁcantly di erent, and higher, tari  elasticities when we exclude the
countries that utilize quotas. The di erence between columns 2 and 4 is not signiﬁ-
cantly di erent at the 5%-level in either table. In other words, given our estimates
from Tables 2 and 3 we cannot reject the hypothesis that OECD countries have the
same elasticities as non-OECD countries, once we control for quotas. Assuming that
the same elasticities that apparently map to both non-OECD and OECD non-quota
importers also map to OECD quota-importers, we are able to convert our quota
coe cients into ETEs using these elasticities.
Because estimated price elasticities are otherwise biased downward, to avoid this
bias when estimating quota price e ects through the system of equations (5) and
(6) we start by imposing the estimated elasticities for the quota-free sub-sample in
column 4. The estimation problem is then speciﬁed as a minimization problem with
mixed-complementarity constraints, where we impose the system of equations (6)
and solve for the set of non-negative quota coe cients and importer and exporter
dummies that minimize the sum of squared errors.11 The resulting estimated non-
linear time trend of quota price e ects gives us a broad sense of the evolution of the
quota wedges over the stages of the ATC phase-out period. Gaussian quadrature is
11Our OLS results in Tables 2 and 3 were estimated in STATA, while the constrained least squares
estimates of the quota premiums, including the application of Gaussian quadrature, were estimated
with GAMS.
13employed, based on the ﬁrst and second moments of coe cients reported in column
4 of Tables 2 and 3 (with the CBI coe cient estimates taken from column 3) to
obtain the standard errors used to calculate t-ratios reported in the detailed annex
tables. More details on this approach are provided in the technical annex. The full
set of estimates by importer and exporter is reported in Annex Tables A-1 to A-6.
Summary results are reported in Table 4. In the tables, blanks means there were no
quotas (like US exports to the EU15 in Table 4) or the quota was estimated to be
non-binding (like Singapore exports to Canada in the later years in Table A-1). The
general pattern is one of signiﬁcant ETE estimates at the start of the ATC, falling
over time as the quotas are phased out. The important exception is China. Figure
1 shows the evolution of two of the politically most signiﬁcant sets of ETEs (China
and India) over time.
Table 4 reports information on the top ﬁve suppliers in textiles and clothing for
the quota using importers, Canada, the USA, and the EU. Since China ranged among
the top suppliers for all quota users in 2001, the evolution of the Chinese export tax
equivalents as implied by the quotas can be read from the table. Canada is the quota
user most compliant with the ATC among all three. The reduction in price wedges
for China is especially impressive. Between 1996 and 2003 the export tax equivalent
was reduced to zero from an estimated 30.4 percent of export price for clothing.
Also against other suppliers, liberalization was substantial in Canada, even if some
high barriers remained, mostly against minor suppliers (for instance Jamaica, Qatar,
and Morocco). Further, as reported in Francois and Spinanger (2004), Canada -
like the US - maintained a pattern of strong protection against suppliers of wool
14products. This results in high constraints for Eastern European suppliers on the
North American market.
Turning to the US, export tax equivalents for China actually went up. Figure
1 shows that this was not a linear trend. Some reduction in ETEs took place until
the end of the second stage of the ATC. Especially notable is the spike at the end
of the ATC. It seems reasonable to blame this spike for contributing to the political
problems caused by a surge in imports from China in early 2005. These ended with
the reimposition of quotas in later 2005. The spike in US quotas follows from the
interaction of several factors. The ﬁrst factor is the failure of quota growth to keep
up with growth in potential trade. This is illustrated in Table 5. The table quantiﬁes
the strong expansion of the Chinese economy and thus the huge increase in export
potential over the life of the ATC. This growth well surpassed quota growth rates.
While the Chinese quotas on the US market increased by 33 percent in textiles and
41 percent in clothing between 1994 and 2004 (see Table 5), Chinese GDP rose by
170 percent over the same period. With a cumulative growth of 61 percent, already
the US GDP growth - as a proxy for the growth of import demand - surpassed the
rate of quota expansion. Another factor was the ability to “borrow forward” on
quotas. This meant that, for example, in late 2000 importers could borrow against
2001 quota limits. Obviously, by late 2004, there were no more quotas to borrow
against, contributing to the late spike in US ETEs as the system, by construction,
became increasingly restrictive.
Note that, like Canada, the US also had substantial protection against East
European suppliers. This corresponded to a narrow set of wool-based products that
15were restricted by US quotas. These quotas were not really an issue at the end
of the Uruguay Round. In 1993, these countries were emerging from the fog of
communism, and were not major players on world markets. Detailed examination
of the quota and trade categories involved shows that the North American regimes
were protecting domestic producers of wool fabrics, suits, and related items. This
protection was quite high. Finally, several countries did graduate into liberal trade
regimes. This includes many of the lower-income Asian and African suppliers, as
reﬂected by their absence from the Tables.12
Overall, despite the surge in ETEs for the US shown in Figure 1, the observed
backloading of trade liberalization vis-` a-vis China should not be surprising and can-
not be ascribed purely to non-compliance with the ATC. It was instead a conse-
quence, in part, of the design of the system. At the same time though, our results
do suggest that the US in general did not implement the ATC according to plan.
Between 1996 and 2004, protection against restricted suppliers went up for 15 WTO
exporters of textiles - with increases in tari  equivalents greater than ten percent
for Indonesia, China, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Uruguay, and Slovakia.
Only four WTO suppliers - Cambodia, Macedonia, Brazil, and Pakistan - faced
decreasing export tax equivalents during the ATC. For clothing, three suppliers -
Uruguay, Cambodia, and India - saw a fall in their ETEs, while nine suppliers faced
increasing price distortions - Turkey, Bulgaria, China, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia,
12Also note that in 2001-2002, Vietnam graduated from Smoot-Hawley to MFN tari s. Vietnam’s
trade is mapped to MFN tari s in the WITS database, though in actuality it faced Smoot-Hawley
tari s. While we do not report the results for Vietnam here (they are not members of the WTO
and were not part of the ATC) we have included Vietnam with Smoot-Hawley dummies in our
estimating framework. Indeed, the move to MFN rates is reﬂected in a dramatic drop in our
estimate of Vietnam’s dummy coe cients when moving into ATC Stage 3.
16Romania, and the Czech Republic. The latter three faced increases to more than
50% of delivered prices. Finally, several countries with quotas had already moved
toward a liberal trade regime, including many of the lower-income Asian and African
suppliers. This can be concluded from the absence of binding quotas under the ATC.
While there is a clear pattern toward liberalization for imports to the European
Union, the degree of liberalization was more limited than in the Canadian case. Al-
though trade with China became more liberalized, the degree of protection remained
high at the end of the ATC.13 Figure 1 and Table 4 both show the fall in protection
against China. However, the tari  equivalents at the end of the ATC remained sub-
stantial. The removal of the quota system by 2005 thus implied a substantial surge in
imports from China. Indeed, preliminary 2004 and 2005 ﬁgures showed tremendous
increases in China’s market share in the EU market, leading to a re-imposition of
quotas by the middle of 2005. We estimate that textile and clothing imports from
India were no longer restricted by the quotas in 2003. As such, the removal was
not expected to show strong direct e ects. Similar to the US market, imports from
Vietnam were also restricted on the EU market at the end of the ATC. The esti-
mated tari  equivalents were comparable to those for China. Thus, while the EU
has moved toward more liberalization in textiles and clothing, protection remained
high against China and Vietnam when the ﬁnal stage of full liberalization in the
ATC was reached. As a consequence, substantial restructuring among suppliers on
13Due to the reporting procedures for the EU to UNCTAD, we do not have full EU import data
for 2004. (Neither do we have full Canadian data.) Given that the ATC was implemented in stages
with 2003 and 2004 both in the third stage, and that the EU and Canadian systems did not have
borrow-forward provisions, we use 2003 estimates as upper bounds for 2004 in the discussion and
in Figure 1.
17the European textile and apparel market starting in 2005 should not be surprising.
The results reported in Table 4 and the annex tables are broadly in line with
other, auction-based estimates in the literature as reported in Table 6. There are
of course some di erences between various estimates of protection due to di erences
in methods, quota price information, and aggregation problems. For example, the
estimates by Mlachila and Yang (2004) and by Andriamananjara et al (2004) are both
based on di erent sets of auction prices, while our estimates are based on a gravity
model. In general, our estimates and both of theirs all report higher protection rates
in the clothing industry than in textiles. This is reasonable, since textiles are one of
the major inputs in clothing, thus blocking textile imports would hurt the domestic
clothing industry, whose protection stands behind the quota system, in the importing
countries. The results for protection against China are broadly in line between the
three di erent studies. Protection against imports from China remained high until
the very end of the quota system in 2005. 14
5 Summary and Discussion
In this paper we have developed a panel-based framework for estimating the export
tax equivalent (ETE) of quotas where the ETEs vary over time. We use this frame-
work to examine the evolution of market access conditions in the textile and clothing
sectors. We work with a panel of bilateral data on textile and clothing trade, un-
derlying bilateral tari s, and the country-pair coverage of quotas under the WTO’s
14For smaller suppliers our estimates tend to be higher than auction-based estimates. As auction
prices reﬂect the rents accruing to exporters, this makes sense to us. Our estimates should also
capture the portion of rents accruing to importers.
18Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). Our estimating framework takes advan-
tage of the panel nature of trade data when calculating export tax equivalents while
allowing for inequality constraints on the quota premium estimates. We also imple-
ment quadrature methods for calculating conﬁdence intervals for our regression-based
NTB measures.
The estimation results we present highlight the advantage of using a non-linear
panel estimation procedure for this type of problem. In particular, we are able
to estimate the time-path of quotas, while also allowing particular quotas to shift
between being binding and non-binding. Such discrete changes in the price impact
of quotas makes sense, as macroeconomic shifts like exchange rate movements can
have dramatic e ect on the relative competitive position of particular suppliers in
particular export markets. Indeed, we do identify such changes over the 10-year
span on the ATC, even in cases where the overall trend is toward liberalization. An
additional advantage of the two stage process is that we are able to control for bias in
elasticity estimates that follows from the quotas themselves. This is quite important,
as the elasticities are themselves necessary for ETE estimation. Finally, an advantage
of the overall approach is our robustness checks through Gaussian quadrature.
While emphasis has been placed, in part, on our approach to estimating the
price impact of quotas, the actual estimates also merit discussion. In our view
the estimated price e ects presented here o er some explanation for the political
di culties that followed the ATC’s end days. The ATC embodied commitments
to a ten-year, staged reduction in quotas. The process was meant to be orderly,
systematic, and transparent. Yet the end of the ATC brought with it sudden surges in
19imports from China, panicked trade ministers, rushed meetings, and the reimposition
of quotas on China by late 2005. This episode is fully consistent with our results.
A key implication from the temporal pattern of our econometric results is that the
problem of China’s textile and clothing sector integration was basically deferred
rather than managed in stages. This was not solely a result of the ATC itself, but
was certainly reinforced by insu cient pre-deﬁned quota expansion rates during a
period of outstandingly strong expansion of China’s supply potential.
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27Technical Annex
In this annex we provide more technical detail on the estimation procedure used.
This includes our two-step procedure to correct for bias in the trade price elasticity
estimates, the ICLS estimator, and the use of Gaussian quadrature to obtain stan-
dard errors as a robustness check for the ETE estimates for quotas.
Two-Step Estimation and ICLS
Because we are controlling for country-speciﬁc e ects with dummies, variations in
our log of tari  markup variable   on a bilateral country-pair basis map directly to log
variations in bilateral pair prices pij and therefore provide us with a direct estimate
of import price elasticities assuming imports vary with respect to price. However, as
discussed in Section 4, trade elasticity estimates from a single equation model where
equation (4) is applied to a full sample (inclusive of quota-using importers) may be
biased downward by the e ect of quotas on trade for ATC importers. This means we
will not have imports varying with respect to bilateral price variation with quotas.
In formal terms, if there is a quota, then the log form of equation (1) will be as
follows:
logmij = min
     
       
logEj +   log ij     logpij +   logPj
log ¯ qi
(7)
In the second case, if the quota ¯ qi is binding, there will be a share of the sample
for which there is no variation on the left-hand side linked to variations on the
right hand side. In other words, a simple application of the gravity model at the
28sector level in the presence of quotas but without controlling for quotas, will bias
our estimates. This is because a regression with the quota sub-sample implies zero
substitution in response to price (i.e. tari ) e ects. Combining these observations in
the unconstrained sample then yields downward-biased substitution elasticities. To
control for this bias we ﬁrst estimate trade elasticities for a restricted sample that
excludes quota-using importers, using equation (4), and then impose the resulting
estimates of coe cient means and standard deviations on the unrestricted (inclusive
of quotas) sample using equations (6) and (5) to estimate the underlying ETEs for
the full sample. This means that the ﬁrst and second moments of our quota wedge
estimates from the second stage estimation, being based on full-sample residuals, are
a function of the corresponding moments for the trade elasticities that were estimated
in the ﬁrst stage. We control for systematic variations in unit value, as stressed in
the quality literature, through country dummies.15
In the second stage we estimate our constrained non-linear optimization problem
with inequality constrained least squares (ICLS). This involves least-squares estima-
tion of equations (5) and (6), given our unbiased coe cients estimated in the ﬁrst
stage for a split sample of quota-free importers. As detailed below, we use quadra-
ture to gauge the distribution of coe cients in equation (6), given uncertainty linked
to ﬁrst stage coe cients. The numerical method we use here is robust to highly
15The recent empirical literature has stressed both di erences in unit values and di erences in
substitution elasticities. For example, Schott (2004) o ers strong evidence of consistent quality
variation depending on the level of development of the exporter. We control for such systematic
unit value variation by importer or exporter through our country dummies. A second issue in the
literature relates to systematic variation in substitution elasticities. This includes Hallak and Schott
(2005). While we test for such variation using split samples (see the discussion of Tables 2 and 3
below) we are unable to reject the hypothesis that once we control for quotas, the elasticities for
rich and poor countries are the same.
29non-linear least-squares objective functions with inequality constraints. In brief, the
algorithm involves GRG-based triangulation, calculation of ﬁrst and second deriva-
tives, and a ”search” routine that follows out possible paths on the local gradients
for unmet constraints that seem to indicate convergence. 16 Chong (1976) ﬁnds that
ICLS estimators have consistently lower mean squared errors for large samples, and
for su ciently large samples are unbiased and consistent. Geweke (1982) uses Monte
Carlo simulations to demonstrate the problems of ignoring inequality constraints for
Bayesian inference.
Gaussian Quadrature
We are interested not only in the ETEs themselves from equation (6), but also
in the robustness of the estimates with respect to underlying uncertainty in our es-
timates of key parameters in equation (5) in the ﬁrst stage. One obvious solution
is Monte Carlo simulations at the second stage. However, we are working with a
large non-linear system of over one hundred equations with inequality constraints
estimated over almost 50 thousand observations. Also, as noted by Haber (1970),
16Technically, ICLS, by deﬁnition, is a special case of the broader class of constrained optimization
problems. GAMS (2005) o ers a number of solvers, employing quite di erent solution algorithms,
for optimization problems involving large non-linear systems of equations subject to equality and
inequality constraints. While we have experimented with several of the solvers (i.e. algorithms) im-
plemented in GAMS, we have used CONOPT here (Drud 2005). In the present context, CONOPT
seems to o er better performance than other GAMS options, like the MINOS and SNOPT solvers.
It is quite likely though that in other cases one of the these other algorithms may perform better.
(See GAMS 2005 for more on these). GAMS/CONOPT uses an algorithm based on the Abadie
and Carpentier (1969) generalized reduce gradient (GRG) algorithm ﬁrst suggested by Abadie and
Carpentier (1969). Actual implementation, reﬂecting modiﬁcations that make it more e cient for
large models is described by Drud (1985, 1992). Detailed information is provided in the technical
annex of Drud (2005). While GAMS/CONOPT was originally designed for models with smooth
functions, it can also be applied to models that do not have di erentiable functions (discontinuous
nonlinear programming models).
30Monte Carlo simulations do not necessarily assure reasonable accuracy. In addition,
to allow for future applications of this type of method involving larger panels, we
really want a less computationally intensive approach. To this aim, and as an al-
ternative to Monte Carlo simulations, we use order three Gaussian quadrature17 to
estimate the variance of our ETE estimates given that they are based on our esti-
mates of the elasticities in equation (5). Gaussian quadrature has been applied to
discrete approximation of the conditional properties of time series for asset pricing
models by (Taussen and Hussey 1991), and also in statistics more generally for non-
parametric estimation of the properties of distribution space (Anderson and Aitkin,
1985; Laird 1978, Aitkin 1999). Laird (1978) and Ma et al. (1996) both demon-
strate the usefulness of this method for approximating distribution functions (as in
the distribution of our quota estimates) without assuming speciﬁc parametric forms
for the distributions. Aitkin (1999) stresses the computational advantages of using
quadrature for non-parametric maximum likelihood estimation.18
Formally, we characterize the solution for a third order approximation for the
distribution of a set of random variables v speciﬁed as a function of stochastic vari-
17Gaussian quadrature builds on treating numerical problems with stochastic exogenous variables
(in this case our second-stage least squares estimation building on uncertain coe cient estimates
from the ﬁrst-stage least squares estimation) as numerical integration problems. Research on nu-
merical methods suggests that quadrature methods are preferable in several ways to Monte Carlo
methods, in many cases being both less computationally demanding and at the same time more
accurate (Geweke 1986, Judge and Takayama 1966, Sch¨ urer 2003, Tauchen and Hussey 1991). It
involves discrete state-space approximation methods (instead of Monte Carlo methods) for estimat-
ing the properties of a given parameter space. See Ma et al (1996) for a discussion of Gaussian
quadrature as applied to functions ranging from smooth to those characterized by endpoint singu-
larities.
18This approach has also become relatively standard for assessing uncertainty in numerical solu-
tions with respect to parameter uncertainty in large-scale general equilibrium models. (See Arndt
1996, Plumb 2001, and Hertel et al 2004).
31ables x. (Stroud 1957, 1960, 1967). This follows Stroud’s solution of deﬁning a set of
systematic draws in x space su cient to obtain estimates of the mean and variance
of our variables v. Formally, for n stochastic variables, we need only k = 2n draws.
Each draw starts by taking g = n/2 pairs (taken to the greatest integer not exceed-
ing n/2) of systematic draws of stochastic variables   with mean zero and standard
deviation one, denoted by  g,k. This yields a matrix   of coe cient pairs  g, with the
number of rows equal to the number of stochastic variables x (equation 8) and each
column deﬁning one quadrature in our parameter space (equation 9). In particular,
denoting the vectors of the mean and standard deviation of variables x by µ and  
and assuming that   is diagonal, the desired quadrature (the set of systematic draws
on x) is obtained as deﬁned in equation (9).
 g =
           















  = µ +    (9)
Once we have the matrix of systematic draws on x, represented in equation (9) by  ,
we then need to take this set   and solve the second-stage least squares estimation
problem 2n times, one with each set of draws on x in  . The resulting set of estimates
for v can then be used to directly estimate the mean and variance for v.
























































Figure 1: The Evolution of Textile and Clothing ETEs for China and IndiaTable 1
A Parade of Acronyms: the evolution of quotas
year overview of events
1955-57 US-Japan dispute leads to a 5 year agreement limiting
textile exports
1958 United Kingdom imposes “voluntary” limitation on cotton
T&C products with Hong Kong, by threatening to otherwise
impose quotas at levels lower than prevailing volumes.
1959 United Kingdom signs restraint agreements with India and
Pakistan.
1960 GATT Contracting Parties recognize the problem of “market
disruption” to serve as an “excuse” for establishing future NTBs.
1961 STA: The Short Term Arrangement (STA) is agreed.
1962 LTA1: The Long Term Arrangement (LTA) is agreed, to
commence October 1, 1962, and last for ﬁve years.
1963-65 US tries and fails to establish agreement on trade in wool products
1966 The United Kingdom implements a global quota scheme in violation
of the LTA. The LTA provides only for product-speciﬁc restraints.
1967 LTA2:Agreement is reached to extend the LTA for three years.
1969-71 United States negotiates VERs with Asian suppliers on wool and
man-made ﬁbers.
1970 LTA3:Agreement is reached to extend the LTA for three years.
It was later extended three months more, to ﬁll the gap until the
MFA came into e ect.
1973 MFA I:The MFA is agreed, to commence January 1, 1974,
and to last for four years.
1977 The European Economic Community and the United States
negotiates bilateral agreements with developing countries
prior to agreeing to extension of the MFA.
1977 MFA II:The MFA is extended for four years.
1981 MFA III:The MFA is renewed for ﬁve years. The USA, under
pressure from increased imports resulting from dollar appreciation,
negotiates tough quotas.
1986 MFA IV:The MFA is extended for 5 years, to conclude with the
expected end of the Uruguay Round.
1991 MFA IV+:The MFA is extended pending outcome of the
Uruguay Round negotiations.
1993 The Uruguay Round (UR) draft ﬁnal act provides for a 10-year
phase-out of all MFA and other quotas on textiles in ATC. MFA
extends until UR comes into force. ATC allows credit for
liberalization in products that are not actually restricted.
1995 ATC1:1st ATC tranche liberalized 16% of 1990 imports.
1998 ATC2:2nd ATC tranche liberalized 17% of 1990 imports.
2001 ATC3:3rd ATC tranche liberalized 18% of 1990 imports.
2005 ATC4:4th ATC tranche liberalized 49% of 1990 imports.
D´ ej` a vu all over again: US and EU re-impose quotas on China.
Source: Based on an update of Francois, Glismann, and Spinanger (2000).Table 2
Textile Regressions
Non-OECD All OECD Non-quota
coe cient All countries importers importers OECD
ln(1 + t) -5.43*** -7.60*** -3.11*** -6.57***
(-23.57) (-24.64) (-8.54) (-13.24)
distance -1.36*** -1.50*** -1.06*** -1.13***
(-82.95) (-65.82) (-40.23) (-28.81)
border 0.79*** 1.39*** 0.37*** 0.29**
(11.92) (13.81) (4.50) (1.97)
EEA 0.26*** 0.81*** 0.02 0.51***
(4.86) (13.81) (0.27) (4.53)
NAFTA 0.08 . 1.55*** 1.47***
(0.26) (5.50) (2.94)
CBI 0.96*** . 1.85*** .
(6.82) (13.96)
adj. R-sq: 0.735 0.694 0.812 0.811
obs: 46,672 19,235 27,437 9,030
df: 44,179 17,161 25,235 7,237
F: 52.92 22.07 49.34 22.60
Pr>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EEA ... European Economic Area; NAFTA ... North American Free Trade Agreement; CBI ...
Caribbean Basin Initiatve; *** (**) denotes>.01 (.05) level of signiﬁcance; t-ratios in parentheses.Table 3
Clothing Regressions
Non-OECD All OECD Non-quota
coe cient All countries importers importers OECD
ln(1 + t) -0.08 -2.26*** 0.02 -2.09***
(-0.28) (-4.65) (0.04) (-3.98)
distance -1.39*** -1.42*** -1.08*** -1.24***
(-81.59) (-58.07) (-40.44) (-32.38)
border 0.83*** 1.35*** 0.51*** 0.56***
(12.25) (12.72) (5.98) (3.62)
EEA 0.36*** 0.72*** 0.42*** 0.10
(6.37) (7.35) (5.55) (-0.92)
NAFTA 0.31 . 1.34*** 1.35***
(1-02) (4.71) (2.78)
CBI 0.14*** . 2.09*** .
(9.23) (15.57)
adj. R-sq: 0.745 0.672 0.800 0.797
obs: 43,273 17,202 26,071 8,284
df: 40,811 15,251 23,884 6,578
F: 52.25 15.83 48.47 20.10
Pr>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EEA ... European Economic Area; NAFTA ... North American Free Trade Agreement; CBI ...
Caribbean Basin Initiatve; *** denotes>.01 level of signiﬁcance; t-ratios in parentheses.Table 4
Top 5 Import Suppliers
2001 ETEs as % of
import 2001 export price
share tari  1996 2003
EU15 : textiles
Turkey 14.0 0.0
China 9.1 8.2 18.6    14.0   
India 8.1 7.5 6.6    2.0   
United States 4.7 6.4
Pakistan 4.6 0.0 13.1    3.2   
ALL 100.0 1.8 1.8 0.7
EU15 : clothing




India 5.8 8.5 19.3   
ALL 100.0 3.2 13.1 3.6
USA : textiles
Mexico 12.7 0.1
European Union 10.9 8.5
China 10.2 7.4 6.5    7.2   
Canada 7.7 0.0
Pakistan 5.4 9.0 5.2   
ALL 100.0 7.9 3.8 3.5
USA : clothing
China 13.3 9.8 43.3    48.1   
Mexico 12.1 0.1
Hong Kong 6.9 11.5
European Union 4.5 10.1
Indonesia 4.3 12.7
ALL 100.0 9.9 10.2 14.5
Canada : textiles
United States 54.2 0.0
European Union 8.7 9.4
China 7.4 13.5 5.9   
Korea, Rep. 4.4 10.3
India 3.6 10.9 0.1
ALL 100.0 5.2 0.5 0.0
Canada : clothing
China 27.4 15.6 30.4   
United States 12.0 0.0
European Union 8.0 16.3
India 7.8 17.7
Hong Kong 6.4 17.9
ALL 100.0 14.5 11.6 0.1
***,** denotes estimated bilateral ETEs signiﬁcant
at the .01 level, and .05 level respectively.Table 5
Cumulative Growth in percent: 1994-2004
quota growth GDP growth
textiles clothing
US EU US EU per-capita in total
importer
United States 49 66
European Union 55 61
exporter
Bangladesh 168 . 168 . 26 53
China 33 50 41 38 151 171
Hong Kong 37 16 17 22 1 16
India 141 50 116 79 57 84
Indonesia 134 83 133 117 19 35
Korea, Rep. 37 70 12 38 34 44
Pakistan 139 79 150 119 30 63
Sri Lanka 134 204 132 204 43 56
Philippines 134 112 119 112 1 21
Thailand 127 116 123 116 -10 -1
Source: Martin (2004), Eurostat, IFS, and own calculations.Table 6
Comparison of Estimates for ETEs, 2003
Values in % of delivered price
importer
US EU
textiles clothing textiles clothing
Quotas for China
Andriamanjara et al. (2004) 10 20 . .
Elbehri (2004) 30 to 48 . .
Martin (2004) 20 36 1 54
Francois and Woerz 7 48 14 19
Quotas for India
Andriamanjara et al. (2004) 18 12 . .
Elbehri (2004) 20 to 41 . .
Mlachila and Yang (2004) 3 20 1 20
Francois and Woerz 3 10 2 .
Source: Andriamanjara et al. (2004), Mlachila and Yang (2004),
and own calculations.Table A-1
Canada: non-linear least squares estimates of ETEs for WTO/ATC
exporters as % of (ETE inclusive) export price for textiles
supplier 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Arab Emirates 22.78 13.57 8.68 5.48 2.53 6.37
(10.53) (11.92) (11.04) (9.53) (8.59) (7.35)
Bangladesh 2.15 0.50 0.10 0.10 0.10
(3.95) (3.96) (2.87) (1.76) (0.53)
Bulgaria 0.50 1.38 2.25 2.25
(1.60) (1.60) (1.60) (1.60)
Cambodia 22.36 14.38 13.72 14.09 11.82 6.28
(10.05) (11.24) (10.24) (9.31) (8.96) (8.99)
China 5.93 1.86 0.30 0.10 0.10
(7.71) (6.07) (2.89) (2.56) (3.90)
CostaRica 2.44 2.53 0.79 1.57 6.19 12.20 15.04 7.41
(1.35) (2.16) (0.66) (1.14) (3.54) (5.88) (6.79) (3.94)
Dom. Rep. 0.30 0.10 0.03 0.01
(0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44)
Hungary 6.28 0.70 0.99 1.67 1.28 0.10
(3.84) (2.72) (1.29) (1.45) (1.47) (0.56)
India 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46)
Jamaica 18.70 7.66 13.34 23.14 29.87 32.07 31.37 32.57
(10.05) (11.24) (10.24) (9.31) (8.96) (8.99) (8.45) (8.22)
Lebanon 34.55 9.58 1.96 1.96
(11.66) (13.62) (14.17) (14.17)
SriLanka 2.63 0.99 0.20 0.02
(2.92) (2.94) (2.95) (2.95)
Lesotho 37.85 16.32 4.49 0.40 0.30
(10.60) (9.18) (6.06) (1.73) (9.65)
Morocco 6.89 1.28 2.53 6.63 10.71 13.27 14.24 14.38
(7.69) (2.90) (5.42) (9.13) (10.39) (10.81) (10.61) (9.41)
Malaysia 6.98 2.53 0.60 0.10
(6.28) (6.43) (6.49) (6.51)
Oman 23.55 6.19 1.28 1.28
(8.15) (9.01) (9.24) (9.24)
Pakistan 0.79 0.30 0.10 0.01
(1.70) (1.70) (1.71) (1.70)
Quatar 4.67 26.69 56.80 66.33 58.30 32.11 16.67
(4.77) (12.18) (8.68) (7.49) (8.08) (10.53) (15.70)
Romania 0.10 0.30 0.70 1.48 2.44
(0.96) (1.19) (1.58) (2.34) (3.74)
Singapore 3.47 1.38 0.40 0.00
(4.19) (3.21) (2.00) (0.70)
Slovakia 1.57 3.10 3.75 3.10 1.57
(2.60) (2.39) (2.14) (1.83) (1.41)
Swaziland 21.63 33.86 38.39 36.39 28.42 15.18
(9.38) (9.87) (10.20) (10.26) (9.80) (8.53)
t-ratios given in parenthesesTable A-2
Canada: non-linear least squares estimates of ETEs for WTO/ATC
exporters as % of (ETE inclusive) export price for clothing
supplier 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Brazil 30.17 8.09 1.67 1.67
(2.89) (3.30) (3.42) (3.42)
China 30.41 12.05 2.82 0.30
(3.26) (3.65) (3.84) (3.89)
Dom. Rep. 4.58 0.99 0.10 0.99
(0.75) (0.76) (0.76) (0.76)
Jamaica 28.98 26.31 37.69 41.18 30.75 8.68 45.21
(2.50) (2.75) (2.55) (2.44) (2.53) (2.40) (2.56)
Morocco 46.89 40.83 49.11 56.82 58.32 52.52 40.86 32.61
(2.77) (2.93) (2.73) (2.54) (2.51) (2.65) (2.90) (2.89)
Poland 11.97 13.64 9.83 5.66 4.31 6.02 7.83 4.12
(2.19) (2.28) (1.94) (1.34) (1.05) (1.29) (1.51) (0.96)
Romania 2.82 8.59 14.97 18.10 12.13
(3.26) (3.14) (3.00) (2.88) (2.70)
Slovakia 1.96 0.20 5.39 13.94 21.69 22.30
(2.48) (0.61) (1.97) (2.12) (2.23) (2.66)
Swaziland 98.33 56.43 7.75
(1.01) (2.57) (3.66)
Turkey 18.10 6.80 1.57 0.20
(2.39) (2.57) (2.66) (2.68)
Uruguay 39.54 16.32 3.85 0.40
(3.22) (3.78) (4.06) (4.14)
t-ratios given in parenthesesTable A-3
EU15: non-linear least squares estimates of ETEs for WTO/ATC
exporters as % of (ETE inclusive) export price for textiles
supplier 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Argentina 6.98 0.60 3.10 4.12 2.72 0.10
(10.71) (4.69) (7.60) (7.91) (7.38) (0.96)
Brazil 5.03 9.01 7.41 4.58 3.01 3.29 3.57 0.20
(6.98) (9.40) (9.18) (7.80) (6.38) (6.87) (7.65) (0.73)
China 18.57 17.42 14.09 11.50 11.11 12.59 14.02 13.40
(11.10) (11.70) (11.54) (11.05) (11.01) (11.49) (11.90) (12.82)
HongKong 6.54 8.34 6.02 2.91 0.79 0.40 0.89
(6.45) (7.80) (7.51) (5.39) (1.93) (1.07) (2.73)
Indonesia 2.15 2.91 3.29 3.01 2.15 0.99 0.03
(2.69) (4.28) (4.47) (4.11) (3.66) (3.03) (0.30)
India 6.63 7.41 5.21 2.82 1.57 1.67 2.06
(8.63) (9.01) (8.23) (6.18) (4.11) (4.51) (6.22)
Korea, Rep. 10.79 10.87 10.23 9.67 9.34 9.01 7.92 4.80
(8.41) (9.06) (9.03) (8.96) (9.19) (9.61) (9.59) (7.37)
Sri Lanka 5.57 3.01 2.63 2.72 2.34 1.19
(5.98) (5.52) (4.62) (4.30) (4.24) (4.27)
Malaysia 9.58 9.42 7.06 5.66 6.54 9.01 10.39 6.70
(7.63) (7.93) (7.31) (6.86) (7.64) (8.79) (9.18) (8.07)
Pakistan 13.12 12.51 9.09 5.66 3.75 3.38 3.19 0.01
(10.30) (10.20) (9.72) (8.49) (7.08) (6.98) (7.87) (0.30)
Peru 9.26 3.66 4.12 6.45 8.00 7.66 5.75 4.40
(10.21) (6.59) (7.38) (9.54) (10.42) (10.50) (9.87) (9.13)
Philippines 0.89 0.20 0.04 0.04
(1.16) (1.17) (1.17) (1.17)
Singapore 11.97 13.12 11.27 8.34 5.75 4.58 4.94 6.90
(8.17) (8.65) (8.87) (8.75) (8.04) (7.14) (7.02) (8.26)
Thailand 5.66 4.49 2.53 1.77 2.63 4.40 4.85 0.30
(6.73) (5.91) (4.11) (3.18) (4.54) (6.41) (7.09) (0.88)
t-ratios given in parenthesesTable A-4
EU15: non-linear least squares estimates of ETEs for WTO/ATC
exporters as % of (ETE inclusive) export price for clothing
supplier 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Brazil 24.76 6.10 0.60 6.10
(2.91) (3.25) (3.35) (3.25)
China 48.51 40.41 29.53 20.06 15.40 16.18 19.35 19.42
(2.72) (2.95) (3.13) (3.17) (3.15) (3.27) (3.36) (3.25)
HongKong 5.30 1.77 0.30 0.10 0.10
(1.67) (1.44) (0.98) (0.94) (1.82)
Indonesia 9.17 3.10 0.50 0.30 0.79 1.19 1.96
(2.56) (1.75) (0.91) (2.10) (1.00) (0.84) (1.47)
India 19.29 11.89 6.28 2.63 0.70
(3.36) (3.20) (2.96) (2.70) (2.45)
Korea, Rep. 42.00 34.34 27.95 23.72 21.88 21.69 21.69 19.48
(2.85) (3.03) (3.12) (3.15) (3.17) (3.19) (3.19) (3.11)
SriLanka 26.25 15.40 5.30 0.20 1.67 7.41 12.36 9.34
(2.91) (3.01) (2.77) (0.36) (1.93) (2.92) (2.98) (2.88)
Peru 20.82 20.13 16.04 10.23 5.21 4.40 11.74 28.88
(3.12) (3.34) (3.30) (2.99) (2.28) (2.15) (3.00) (2.94)
Philippines 29.03 29.18 25.43 21.57 19.87 20.51 21.45 18.43
(3.03) (3.11) (3.13) (3.12) (3.15) (3.24) (3.32) (3.27)
Singapore 14.97 1.86 0.60 3.29 4.76 3.19
(2.82) (1.97) (0.66) (1.99) (2.36) (2.52)
Thailand 32.66 27.11 20.70 16.11 14.38 14.53 13.49 5.66
(3.02) (3.15) (3.17) (3.12) (3.13) (3.24) (3.34) (2.66)
t-ratios given in parenthesesTable A-5
USA: non-linear least squares estimates of ETEs for WTO/ATC
exporters as % of (ETE inclusive) export price for textiles
supplier 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Bangladesh 0.30 0.79 2.25 3.57 3.38
(7.53) (7.52) (7.46) (7.41) (7.41)
Brazil 6.19 9.58 8.84 6.19 3.19 0.99 0.01 0.01
(13.56) (13.16) (12.91) (12.62) (11.99) (10.51) (0.49) (0.30)
Cambodia 52.72 18.43 1.19 4.31 6.54 4.49
(9.35) (12.24) (16.81) (12.39) (12.36) (12.55)
China 6.45 4.12 4.40 5.39 5.93 6.19 7.24 11.11 20.19
(12.10) (10.39) (12.39) (14.55) (15.57) (16.26) (16.67) (15.51) (13.23)
Colombia 14.46 4.49 0.05 0.10 3.29 7.92 12.66 16.32 18.23
(5.51) (5.87) (0.36) (0.46) (3.67) (4.69) (5.31) (6.03) (6.89)
Czech Rep. 0.99 2.53 4.49 6.72 9.67 13.72 19.35
(1.98) (2.26) (2.77) (3.80) (6.03) (10.36) (11.83)
Hungary 3.57 7.49 10.15 11.43 12.36 14.89 22.00
(6.20) (5.95) (5.85) (6.14) (7.45) (10.91) (12.40)
Indonesia 0.10 0.70 2.06 3.38 4.21 4.49 4.76 5.84 9.17
(0.58) (1.64) (3.57) (5.09) (6.45) (7.65) (8.25) (8.43) (7.37)
India 3.75 4.31 3.85 3.01 2.06 1.57 1.77 3.01 5.48
(9.95) (11.34) (11.08) (9.72) (7.51) (5.70) (6.16) (9.60) (11.57)
Jamaica 0.30 0.60 2.53 5.30 7.41 6.80
(1.68) (1.24) (1.98) (2.44) (2.76) (3.01)
Korea, Rep. 0.50 0.89 0.79 0.30 0.89 4.31
(2.37) (2.22) (1.95) (1.37) (8.28) (4.69)
Malaysia 0.03 0.02 0.20 0.79 2.44 5.48
(1.87) (0.70) (2.03) (3.43) (4.68) (5.68)
Pakistan 5.21 1.57 0.30 0.03 0.60 2.82
(8.55) (9.00) (9.65) (5.92) (7.54) (7.57)
Poland 0.03 5.84 8.34 9.34 9.99 11.11 13.12 16.18 19.94
(0.30) (4.66) (5.48) (6.50) (7.34) (7.70) (8.20) (10.08) (12.24)
Romania 4.67 2.25 0.30 1.86 5.48 9.58 12.51 11.89
(6.85) (4.66) (1.69) (11.59) (9.96) (9.89) (11.83) (19.60)
Slovakia 0.10 12.36 18.70 21.01 20.89 19.74 19.61 22.78 31.18
(0.62) (7.61) (8.62) (9.24) (9.23) (8.62) (8.22) (9.38) (11.54)
Thailand 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.60 1.57
(2.10) (2.10) (2.10) (2.10) (2.09)
Turkey 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.20 0.50
(1.06) (1.06) (1.06) (1.06) (1.06)
Uruguay 2.15 4.12 4.94 5.21 6.98 13.19 26.90
(4.99) (4.58) (4.22) (4.28) (5.63) (8.09) (8.72)
t-ratios given in parenthesesTable A-6
USA: non-linear least squares estimates of ETEs for WTO/ATC
exporters as % of (ETE inclusive) export price for clothing
supplier 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Bulgaria 0.40 0.30 0.06 0.70 4.12 12.74 28.06
(1.52) (1.19) (0.52) (0.83) (2.13) (3.24) (3.49)
Brazil 3.38 0.10 0.60 0.60 2.91 11.66
(2.43) (0.60) (5.05) (4.67) (4.22) (3.97)
Cambodia 37.73 16.11 4.12 0.79 0.79
(3.17) (3.67) (3.93) (4.00) (4.00)
China 43.31 42.36 36.99 31.55 29.68 32.98 40.19 48.08 53.01
(2.99) (3.00) (3.13) (3.26) (3.30) (3.22) (3.04) (2.85) (2.74)
Colombia 0.89 0.20 0.20 0.89 3.57
(0.71) (0.71) (0.71) (0.71) (0.70)
Czech Rep. 13.57 30.84 38.20 42.66 47.84 55.04 63.90 72.91 80.56
(2.18) (2.75) (2.80) (2.79) (2.73) (2.59) (2.38) (2.14) (1.87)
Hungary 0.00 0.40 8.09 17.70 26.25 32.93 38.16 43.18 49.92
(0.59) (2.78) (2.74) (2.69) (2.70) (2.78) (2.88) (2.83)
India 16.60 8.51 3.10 0.40 1.67 5.12 10.31 17.01
(3.72) (3.31) (2.74) (1.39) (2.78) (2.97) (3.29) (3.69)
Poland 21.20 46.44 52.79 54.07 55.44 58.40 61.48 60.92 48.93
(2.69) (2.72) (2.58) (2.53) (2.47) (2.41) (2.37) (2.45) (2.81)
Romania 3.57 3.94 11.66 22.30 33.02 42.50 50.40 57.08 63.15
(1.80) (1.86) (3.23) (3.20) (2.99) (2.81) (2.66) (2.55) (2.42)
Slovakia 0.00 5.57 17.76 33.33 47.40 55.89 55.56
0.00 (3.03) (2.87) (2.65) (2.47) (2.45) (2.67)
Turkey 0.00 1.19 0.30 1.77 5.84 11.35 16.39 18.50
0.00 (1.02) (0.70) (1.70) (1.72) (1.89) (2.45) (3.95)
Uruguay 50.67 63.33 56.35 42.59 32.71 33.91 41.11 40.16
(2.73) (2.42) (2.61) (2.91) (3.03) (2.91) (2.77) (2.82)
t-ratios given in parentheses